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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the Case: 
This is a quiet title case involving the interpretation of a temporary easement. Appellants 
Andre\v and Kimberly Kirk ('"Kirks") seek to quiet title to the southeast comer of their property 
lot located in a plated subdivision in Blaine County, Idaho. The Respondent Ann Wescott ("Ms. 
Wescott") owns the adjoining lot and contends that the southeast comer of the Kirks' lot is 
encumbered by a '·temporary Easement of Access'' granted to her by the prior owner/developer 
of the lots. The purported ''temporary Easement of Access" (hereinafter ·'Temporary Easement'') 
was attached as an exhibit to the Warranty Deed that transferred Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott. 
The Kirks contend that the purported Temporary Easement never came "In Effect" for 
lack of satisfaction of an express condition precedent stating that ·'[t]his Easement of Access 
shall become · In Effect' only upon receipt by the owner ( of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS 
for the owner ( of Lot 8) to access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line 
( of Lot 8) and beginning at Bench Road." The document further places a one year time limit on 
the Temporary Easement in any event. \Vhich has long since expired. Notwithstanding, the 
District Court ruled on paiiial summary judgment that as a matter of law the Temporary 
Easement must remain permanently on the SE corner of Kirks' Lot 7. The District Court denied 
two successive Motions to Amend Complaint. After a short trial limited in scope to the issue of 
equities, the District Court dismissed the Kirks' Complaint. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings: 
The Kirks filed a Complaint to quiet title to the SE corner of their Lot 7 against the 
Temporary Easement pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-401 et seq. against Ms. Wescott on August 3, 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - I 
2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 8. The disputed alleged 
reads as 
105 Jones 
This Warranty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of 
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit over the Southeast comer of Lot 7 of Block 1 
of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to 8 of the Glassford Heights Sub. 
When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent 
access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot shall Quitclaim the 
Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of \vritten receipt thereof. 
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt by 
the owner ( of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner ( of Lot 8) to 
access Lot 8 across USFS lands on the East side of the property line ( of Lot 8) 
and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall remain "In Effect" 
only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. The 
O\Vner' s of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within one 
year or upon completion of the driveway, \Vhichever occurs first. 
R. Vol. L p. 13. The Complaint alleged that Ms. Wescott obtained a 30-year (with 10-year 
renewal) access easement in May 2007 from the United States Forest Service ("USFS") on the 
east side of her Lot 8 such that the conditions for requiring a Temporary Easement no longer 
existed. R. Vol. L pp. 16-21. Ms. Wescott answered and filed her Motion for Summary 
Judgment on October 28, 2013, arguing that the Kirks' Complaint must be dismissed on the basis 
that a USFS Easement does not provide permanent access to Lot 8, and that one portion of the 
Temporary Easement could not be satisfied according to the express terms. R. Vol. l, p. 26. The 
Kirks filed their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5, 2014. R. Vol. 1, p. 45. The 
Kirks' Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment asserted that the 
Temporary Easement never came into effect or, if it did, it expired under its expressed terms, or 
in the alternative, that Ms. Wescott abandoned her interest in the Temporary Easement. R. Vol. 
1, p. 47. 
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At the summary judgment oral on 3 the District Court issued an 
bench 
Well, certainly is a problem, it face the document 
exactly what was intended. I don't think I can look at any particular line and say 
this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result. I think you 
have to read the document as a whole and you can't pick out one part and have 
that be determinative, and that seems to be the problem here. 
But I have to rule as a matter of law that the forest service has not given 
permanent access, and I think that that is clear from the pleadings and from the 
cross motions for summary judgment. 
And I know that I am adding words that are not there in order to come up with 
these possible explanations, but to me that's the only thing that language could 
mean. 
Another way that I looked at this is to say, well, this is a quiet title action. It's. I 
think, essentially equitable. I don't think it's a jury trial issue. 
And lord knows what the last line means. but because they solved it, it would 
seem to be very inequitable to the party who obtained the easement to then turn 
around and have a court say, well, you really got hoaxed here. 
It is a cloud, I certainly agree, on the servient lot, but I hope it's not a cloud that 
ever causes a problem. 
Tr., Court's Rulings and Remarks on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014, pp. 2. 3, 8. 
11, I 2. 13. The District Court went on in its oral ruling to grant partial summary judgment to 
Ms. Wescott finding: (i) that the U.S. Forest Service has not provided a permanent access to Ms. 
Wescott; (ii) that Blaine County is no longer in a position to provide any access and. therefore, 
cannot fulfill one of the conditions of the Temporary Easement; and (iii) that there has been no 
abandonment of the Temporary Easement. Tr., Court's Rulings and Remarks on Summary 
Judgment Motions, March 31. 2014, p. 20, L. 15-20. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 3 
On 18, 2014, the Kirks to Amend Complaint based upon the 
that being an 
description referenced ·' LOTS 8 & 9. 
newly discovered easement, while issued to the owners (Woodcocks) of Lot 9, did not have a 
year term limit and the recorded legal description arguably was intended to benefit Westcott's 
adjoining Lot 8 '·to continue for as long as the property served is used for a single family 
residence.'' R. Vol. 1, pp. 111-125. The Kirks filed the Plaintiffs· Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Amend Complaint, setting out the newly discovered evidence of the August 2000 
USFS easement providing the arguable permanent access to Wescotfs Lot 8. R. Vol. I, p. 126. 
Ms. Wescott filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint on 
April 28, 2014. R. Vol. I. p. 148. A hearing was held on said motion on May 5, 2014, and the 
District Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the complaint once again, ruling from the 
bench with statements including: 
[S]o whatever evidence we gather of Woodcocks' intent and the government's 
intent as expressed to Blaine County or the intent that might be gleaned from the 
parties and Mr. Manwaring saying we can present evidence of all these people's 
intent, that matters not. 
And I can take evidence for weeks on what everybody intended and what they 
wanted to do . . . . 
That brings up a couple of other points. Even on its face, if I - if I heard 
additional evidence, the easement that exists now from the government says it 
expires. And we can argue about what that means. and I can come up with my 
conclusions about what that means . . . . 
My point is. is that it's a question when it expires. It's a question whether it's 
pennanent so long as it's used for a personal residence. To me, that's not 
permanent. You can argue that it is. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 4 
So if I entertain the motion to amend 
the relief 
I can't solve the problem by ente1iaining evidence as to the questions that Mr. 
Manwaring has been able to raise. When he says, you know, there are issues of 
fact and there are questions of intent, I'll certainly agree with that, but even 
resolving those and even ifI resolved his favor. I would simply be leaving 
Ms. Wescott with a worse problem than the Kirks have. 
But if we're going to have a trial and argue about it, it just better be real clear that 
it's a permanent easement or the trial is going to take five minutes, because I don't 
need to hear intent, I don't need to hear -- I don't want to hear any evidence of 
who intended what or, really. what you were trying to get at with the amended 
complaint. 
But like I say, I want to be clear here. I don't want to have a trial and hear what 
anybody intended. 
Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks. May 5, 201 pp. 5, 6. 7, 8, 9, 13, 18. The Court 
entered an Order dated May 28, 2014 denying the Motion to Amend. R. Vol. I, p. 174. A trial 
was set for July 23, 2014 limited to the issue of equities, but excluding any evidence of the intent 
as to interpretation of the Temporary Easement. 
Prior to trial, a Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint was filed by Plaintiffs on July 14, 
2014, due to receipt of an extremely late supplemental document production from Ms. Wescott, 
including 109 pages of documents that had not previously been produced by Defendant, some of 
which had been withheld but suppmied Plaintiffs· assertion in the proposed First Amended 
Complaint that the Woodcocks' August 2000 USFS easement was intended to benefit Wescott's 
Lot 8. R. Vol. I. pp. 2 I 6-261. At the trial held on 23. 201 the District Court denied the 
Kirks' Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint, refused to admit certain documents to show intent 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 5 
parties. dismissed Plaintiffs' petition to 
evidence of 
August 25, 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 281. 
to 
on Appeal, July 23, 
and excluding 
Judgment for the Defendant Wescott on 
On September 4. 2014, Ms. Wescott filed her Memorandum of Costs [and attorney fees]. 
(Suppl. R. pp. 1-29), to which Plaintiffs filed a timely Objection to Memorandum of Costs and 
Amended Objection and Motion to Disallow Memorandum of Costs (Supp. R. pp. 30-35). The 
District Court heard the attorney fee claim on October 27, 2014 and denied the attorney fees in a 
bench ruling followed by an Order Denying Attorney Fees entered on November 3, 2014. R. 
Vol. I, p. 289. 
The Kirks filed their Notice of Appeal to this Court on October 2, 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 285. 
After the attorney fee issue was decided an Order Denying Attorney Fees and an Amended 
Judgment were entered on November 3, 2014. R. Vol. 1, pp. 289, 293. Kirks then filed an 
Amended Notice of Appeal on November 14. 2014. R. Vol. I, p. 295. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 14(a) and 15(b), Ms. Wescott had 42 days from the Order Denying 
Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment (11/3/15) to file any cross-appeal, meaning Ms. Wescott 
could file a notice of cross appeal on or before December 15. 2014. However, Ms. Wescott did 
not file her Notice of Cross-Appeal until February 23, 2015, a full 98 days after the Order 
Denying Attorney Fees was entered. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 70. Rather. on November 13, 2014, Ms. 
Wescott filed a Motion to Reconsider Defendant's Memorandum of Costs. Suppl. R. p. 58. 
(iii) Statement of Facts: 
In 1997. Leif Odmark (hereinafter ·'Mr. Odmark'') was the owner of undeveloped real 
property, including Lot 7 and Lot 8, in the Glassford Heights Subdivision in Blaine County. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 6 
Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 13 8-139. Douglas and Charlotte Woodcock (hereinafter "Woodcocks") 
owned the adjacent Lot 9. R. Vol I, p. 140. Bordering Lots 7. 8, and 9, was undeveloped platted 
access to the properties on the west border of the lots designated as "Jones Lane." R. Vol. I, p. 
131; and platted map of Lots 7, 8, and 9 of Glassford Heights Subdivision at R. Vol. I, p. 21. 
Development of the Jones Lane access would have required construction of a driveway from 
State Highway 75 across jurisdictional wetlands. R. Vol I, p. 141. The Jones Lane property was 
owned by Blaine County. Id. There was also access on the east side of Lots 8 and 9 over U .S. 
USFS lands. R. Vol. I, p. 61 . The USFS road access provided the historical access to both Lots 
8 and 9. Id. A diagram of the Jots and roads is as follows : 
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APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 7 
R. Vol. I, 21 (modified with owners· 
1997 Woodcocks. owners to 
to protect and preserve 
141. This would prevent any development of Jones Lane for access to Lots 7, 8, and 9. Id. In 
conjunction with this request. the Woodcocks also applied for a Special Use Permit through the 
USFS for a permanent access easement over the USFS land bordering the east property line of 
Lots 8 and 9. R. Vol I, p. 130. A Special-Use Application and Report, prepared by Woodcock 
and Bruce Smith, a Professional Land Surveyor of Galena Engineering. Inc., states as follows: 
The proposed use is a permanent easement for all-year residential 
purposes, including utilities and access. for Glassford Heights Subdivision, Lot 9, 
from the existing Bench Road, a public road maintained by Blaine County .... 
The proposed use would provide upland access to Lot 8 as well and as Lot 7 is 
using upland access from Bench Road, eliminate the need to build Jones Lane and 
provide an opportunity for the preservation of the wetlands. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
On July I 1998, the then owner/developer of Lots 7 and 8, Leif Odmark, wrote to the 
USFS in favor of the proposed Woodcock Easement referring to it as a ·'permanent easement." 
R. Vol. Ip. 234. On March 5, 1999, the USFS issued a News Release soliciting comments on the 
proposed easement stating that the proposed easement actually was an old right of way "which 
parallels Lots 8 and 9 [in Glassford Heights Subdivision]." ·'Access to these two lots was 
originally planned to be through Jones Lane." Exhibit 8 lodged with trial exhibits. 
While Woodcocks' Special Use Application was pending with the USFS and Blaine 
County, Mr. Odmark sold Lot 8 to Mr. and Mrs. McEiveen1 (now known as Ms. Wescott) on 
April 14, 2000. The Warranty Deed granted by Mr. Odmark to the McElveens [Ms. Wescott] 
contains the following language: 
1 Ann McElveen returned to her maiden name of Wescott after her divorce from Mr. McElveen. Lot 8 was 
transferred via Quitclaim Deed to Ms. Wescott as a result of the divorce. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 8 
Block l of GLASSFORD 
L 
R. VoL I, p. 12. The Wmwnty Deed's Exhibit which describes the "temporary Easement of 
~ CC"'"S" {'r\nta;ns no m"t"c cnnd bounrlc J,,,~al rl 0 s"r;,._+1·0,,., t'or "Il e00en1en+ b»+ rl 0 °C";b00 +i.."' ;{ J,, vv vv " .1...1. i .1.1- vl-vu UJ uu 1\..5 uv \..- ipt u a1 a.:, 1 11t., ut u\..-.:, .11- \..0 LII\... 
following terms: 
Exhibit ·• 1" 
105 Jones Lane 
This WmTanty Deed shall include a temporary 25 foot wide Easement of 
Access. (See plat map - Exhibit 2) over the Southeast corner of Lot 7 of Block I 
of the Glassford Heights Sub for access to Lot 8 of the Glassford Heights Sub. 
When/if Blaine county and the United States Forest Service provide a permanent 
access across USFS Lands to Lot 8, the owner of Lot shall Quitclaim the 
Easement of Access back to Lot 7 within 30 days of written receipt thereof 
This Easement of Access shall become "In Effect" only upon receipt 
by the owner (of Lot 8) of written denial by the USFS for the owner (of Lot 8) 
to access Lot 8 across U SFS lands on the East side of the property line ( of Lot 
8) and beginning at Bench Road. This Easement of Access shall remain "In 
Effect" only until Blaine County agrees to allow access to Lot 8 from Jones Lane. 
The owner's of Lot 8 shall Quitclaim the Easement of Access back to Lot 7 
within one vear or upon completion of the driveway, whichever occurs first. 
R. VoL I, p. 13 (Emphasis Added). The condition precedent to the easement, i.e. the denial by 
USFS of access to Lot 8, had not been satisfied. R. Vol. L p. 67, ,r 6. 
Just four months later, the USFS granted Woodcocks' Special Use Application by issuing 
a Forest Road Easement recorded in Blaine County on August 15, 2001 as Instrument No. 
442116. It provided the legal description title as "A 33' WIDE EASEMENT TO ACCESS 
LOTS 8 & 9.'' R. Vol. I pp. 121-125. The easement was to ··continue for as long as the prope11y 
served is used for a single family residence." R. Vol I, p. 121 ( emphasis in original). 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 9 
Blaine County Board of Staff Report vacating Jones 
Woodcock U Forest Service, 6. easement provides access to 
Lots 8 and 9 from Bench Road on the east the lots." R. Vol. I, p. 237, , 6 (emphasis 
added). 
The McElveens (Ms. Wescott) proceeded to develop Lot 8 and built a home and 
constructed a paved driveway accessing the USFS road. R. Vol. I, p. 60-70. The Temporary 
Easement of access across Lot 7 was never used or needed by the McElveens (Ms. Wescott) 
from the time Lot 8 was acquired on April 1 2000 until present. R. VoL L p. 65. 
Unfortunately, this documentary evidence surrounding the Woodcocks' application for a 
permanent easement: the Application; the Blaine County's letter support for the application; the 
developer-Odmark's letter of support for the application; the USFS' News Release; the County's 
interpretation of the easement; and the Woodcocks' easement itself, were not discovered until 
after the Complaint was filed and summary judgment was pending. A Motion to Amend 
Complaint (R. Vol L pp. 111-125) and a second Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 216-261) were filed and asserted. but the District Court denied both motions, refusing to 
consider the intent of the parties in interpreting Wescott's Temporary Easement. Transcript of 
Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5. 2014, pp. 5, 6, 7. 8. 9, 13. 18; Transcript on Appeal, July 
23, 2014, pp. 4-31. 
On May 15, 2007, a subsequent non-exclusive access easement was granted directly to 
Ms. Wescott by the USFS, and recorded as Instrument No. 547881, Records of Blaine County, 
Idaho, on May 22, 2007 (the "Wescott Easement"). R. Vol. I, p. 16-21. The Wescott Easement 
covers the same location and includes the identical '·Exhibit A" establishing the property 
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of easement as attached in A Woodcock Easement. Id. at 
easement states 
8 9, GLASSFORD subsequent 
easement has caused confusion with its expiration date of December 31, 2036, and renewal 
period of 10 years ··c or the estimated project, whichever is less)." R. Vol. I, p. 16. By 
its terms, the easement does not override the pre-existing Woodcock Easement that was granted 
in August 2000. Id 
The USFS access road became known as Blackwood Lane. R. Vol l. p. 58-59. Ms. 
Wescott's address is listed as 10 Blackwood Lane, Ketchum, Idaho. Id Ms. Wescott's driveway 
is at least 25' away from the boundary line of Lot 7. Id. at 20. Her driveway extends directly 
onto the USFS easement road. R. Vol. I, p. 61-62. Ms. Wescott has never driven over any 
portion of Lot 7 for access to her property. R. Vol. L p. 65. Ms. Wescott has had continuous 
use of the USFS road and there has been no interference of Ms. Wescott's use of this road by 
neighbors, USFS. Blaine County, or anyone 
On or about January 11. 2010, the 
R. Vol. I, p. 63. 
acquired title to Lot 7. R. Vol. 1, p. 10,, 1 
Sometime later in 2010, subsequent to the purchase of Lot 7. the Kirks became aware that Ms. 
Wescott claimed to own an easement in 
action to quiet title to their property. 
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southeast corner of Lot 7. Appellants brought this 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
commit 
to consider issues 
Temporary Easement? 
judgment 
regarding 
2. Did the District Court commit error in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Complaint based upon newly discovered evidence bearing on the intent of the parties 
to the Temporary Easement? 
3. Did the District Court commit error in denying Plaintiffs· Renewed Motion to Amend 
Complaint based upon Defendant's withholding of documents until two weeks before 
trial which documents additionally supported Plaintiffs' asserted intent of the parties 
to the Temporary Easement? 
4. Should the District Court have found after trial that the Temporary Easement was 
void for lacking an adequate legal description? 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Is the Supreme Court without jurisdiction to hear the Notice of Cross-Appeal because 
it was filed untimely? 
2. Did the District Court commit error in finding that the Plaintiffs' Complaint was not 
filed or pursued frivolously pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121? 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
A. Summary Judgment. 
When this Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment, it uses the same 
standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Carl H 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 993 P.2d 1 197 (1999). Summary 
judgment is proper '·if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law:' Id. at 870. ''The record is construed in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving and reasonable are drawn favor of 
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party. If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions. summary judgment is 
36 P.3d 81 8 9 
B. Ambiguity of Document. 
'·The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's 
interpretation of a contract or instrument." A1achado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212,217,280 P.3d 715. 
720 (Idaho 2012). ··The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by 
the trial court as a question of law." Id however. the instrument of conveyance is 
ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact.'' Id "Whether 
a document is ambiguous is a question of law.'' Id. 
C. Motion to Amend Complaint. 
"A court's decision to allow the amendment pleadings is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion. this Court asks: 
·(I) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion: (2) whether it acted 
within the outer boundaries of that discretion and consistently with any applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason.'" Hayward at 345 
(citing Hough v. Fry, 131 Idaho 230,232,953 P.2d 980. 982 (1998)) (internal citations omitted). 
II. On Summary Judgment, the District Court Should Have Found the 
Temporary Easement to be Ambiguous as a Matter of Law and 
Thereafter Allowed a Trial on the Facts to Determine the Intent of the 
Parties. 
The primary goal in construing a deed is .. to seek and give effect to the real intention of 
the parties." Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636. 639, 315 P.3d 824, 827 (Idaho 2013) (citing 
1vfachado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 218. 280 715. 1 (2012)). ·'If the language of a deed is 
ambiguous, determining the parties' intent is a question of fact and may only be settled by a trier 
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fact.'' Id. "[W]hen the language is unambiguous, intention of the parties a 
matter the deed's evidence. 
Whether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law. Id. at 638 (citing Ida-Therm. LLC v. 
Bedrock Geothermal, LLC, 154 Idaho 6, 8, 293 P.3d 630, 632 (2012)). "Ambiguity may be 
found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting interpretations." Id. at 639. 
However, ambiguity does not exist simply because opposing parties differ in their 
interpretations. Id. ( citing Jasso v. Camas Cnty., 151 Idaho 790, 798, 264 P .3d 897, 905 (2011) ). 
''To determine whether a deed is ambiguous, [the deed] must be reviewed as a whole." Id. 
(citing Neider v. Shaiv, 138 Idaho 503, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003)). 
Likewise, ··[i]n construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the 
easement is to be interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the 
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was granted." Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 
282,286,246 P.3d 391. 395 (2010) (citing Kou/ouch v. Kramer. 120 Idaho 65, 69, 813 P.2d 876, 
880 (1991)). 
The Temporary Easement contains numerous ambiguous statements and terms. The trial 
court stated in the initial hearing in this matter, ·'Well, this certainly is a problem, and it isn't 
clear from the face of the document exactly what was intended. I don't think I can look at any 
particular line and say this is clear and unambiguous and therefore this yields a clear result. I 
think you have to read the document as a and you can't pick out one part and have that be 
determinative, and that seems to be the problem here.'' Transcript Court's Rulings & Remarks 
on Summary Judgment Motions, March 31, 2014. p. L. 9-16. That being said, however, the 
trial court then focused its interpretation of the Temporary Easement only on the specific 
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of ''permanent" sentence taking a narrow 
as a 
the 
Easement is a classic example of an ambiguous document, especially when one considers the 
subsequently discovered documents including: Woodcocks' Special Use Permit Application: 
Blaine County letter to USFS; Odmark's letter to the USFS; the USFS' News Release; the 
August 2000 Woodcocks' Forest Road Easement; and the Staff Rep011 to the Blaine County 
Board of County Commissioners. 
''Ambiguity can be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting 
interpretations. The trier of fact must then determine the intent of the parties according to the 
language of the conveyance and the circumstances surrounding the transaction." Marek v. 
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920. 923 (Idaho 201 
Appellants, Kirks, contend that the district com1 erred in not specifically ruling as a 
matter of law that the easement terms were ambiguous. If such a ruling had been entered, the 
com1 would be required at trial to consider all extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties and 
the circumstances in existence at the time the easement was drafted. 
III. The District Court abused its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs' Motions to 
Amend Complaint and Excluding Evidence of the Intent of the 
Temporary Easement. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 5(a) specifies '"[A] party may amend a pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires ... " I.R.C.P. l 5(a). ··[I]n the interest of justice, district courts should favor 
liberal grants of leave to amend a complaint." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corporation, 136 
Idaho 342, 345, 33 P.3d 816, 819 (Idaho 2001) Carl H Christensen Family Trust v. 
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Christensen. 133 Idaho 866, 87L 993 P2d 1 (1999)). the absence of any apparent 
reason - as 
to cure deficiencies undue to 
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. - the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, be freely given." Id. at 346. 
·'Other factors this Court considers when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a 
motion to amend include: 1) the amended pleading provides a valid claim; 2) if the opposing 
party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the claim: and 3) if 
available defense such as the statute of limitations.'' Id 
opposing party has an 
In the instant case, the Kirks moved to amend the complaint shortly after the summary 
judgment hearing, due to the discovery new evidence and potential witnesses that would 
support the assertion that the Woodcock Easement granted by the USFS in August 2000 was the 
very easement contemplated by the language four months earlier in April 2000 in the Warranty 
Deed/Temporary Easement from Mr. Odmark to Ms. Wescott. R. Vol. I, p. 115, ,i,-; 8, 10. The 
Motion to Amend Complaint identified the newly discovered documents of: the Woodcock 
Forest Road Easement of August 2000; the Special-Use Application and Report: and an August 
l I, 1998 letter from Blaine County to USFS. R. Vol. I. pp. 121-125, 130-142. On May 5, 2014, 
the District Court wrongly denied the motion to amend the complaint holding that it refused to 
consider the new documents as evidence of intent bearing on the Temporary Easement. 
Transcript of Court's Rulings and Remarks, May 5, 2014, pp. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 18; R. Vol. I, p. 
174. This was an abuse of discretion and contrary to Rule 15( a) that amendments should be 
"freely given.'' 
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Kirks subsequently filed a Complaint on July l 20 I 
a 
14, 1998. letter from Odmark to a Staff Report to Blaine County Board of 
Commissioners. R. Vol. L pp. 216-245, 261-263. Both of these documents supp011ed the 
allegation in the proposed First Amended Complaint that the ··permanent easement'' referenced 
in the Temporary Easement was intended to mean the August 2000 Woodcock Easement. 
In June 2013. counsel for Ms. Wescott responded to Plaintiffs' requests for production of 
documents for all relevant documents and correspondence pertaining to the case described in 
several ways. R. Vol. I, pp. 219-223. When these documents were not forthcoming, a letter was 
sent to Mr. Trout in February 2014 seeking production of such documents. R. Vol. L pp. 224-
226. Again, there were no documents provided as Mr. Trout claimed he had produced all the 
documents. R. Vol. I, pp. 227-228. Then, on July 7, just two weeks before triaL Mr. Trout 
supplemented with over 100 pages of documents, including documents with key information as 
to the intent and circumstances surrounding the historical information leading up to the drafting 
of the Temporary Easement. R. Vol. L pp. 229-245. Kirks· counsel argued in support of the 
Renewed Motion to Amend Complaint: 
Now, Mr. Trout had these documents m possession, and he didn't 
produce them to me before Ms. Wescott's deposition. He didn't produce them to 
me before we had the cross motion for summary judgment. He didn't produce 
them to me while we had the motion to amend in May [2014], and he didn't 
produce them to me until after my deadline to produce my evidence in preparation 
for this hearing today, this trial today [July 23. 2014]. My deadiine was July 2nd 
[2014]. 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 11-12. 
These documents are key. also infer and indicate that the Woodcock 
easement of August 2000 was this supposed permanent easement that Mr. 
Odmark references to s the one they were 
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contemplating when he made up 
temporary easement. 
based 
language that 1s so ambiguous on the 
disclosure, 
I think only fair and equitable motion to amend be renewed, the 
renewed motion be granted, and the Court give plaintiff the opportunity to go 
forward into December 1 ih [2014] to develop that additional claim under the 
amended complaint, which is the same that was filed back in April [2014). 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 12-13. 
When asked by the District Court to respond to the allegations that the documents had 
been \vTOngfolly withheld. Mr. Trout explained as follows: 
Well, that's my fault. I['m] not going to deny I didn't withhold them. I 
didn't actually understand that I had them. I had a bunch of documents we 
looked at what we thought was relevant to the case, and we produced documents 
as pm1 of the expert opinion. And the only reason we made a supplement, the 
only reasons there was one reason: We just threw the whole batch in the 
scanner, scanned them and sent them. 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 
Now, if I made a mistake, I' 11 · fess up. If I wrong about making that 
supplement I'll 'fess up. If it was late, I'll ·fess up. At the end of the day, Judge, 
so what? He has two inadmissible documents that mean nothing to the 
interpretation of this case; and yes, they could have been found. We didn't go 
looking for them because we didn't looking for them. They just happened to 
be in a big group of paper. 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, p. 23. While the District Court expressed sympathy, he 
nevertheless denied the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment reat1irming his previous 
summary judgment ruling that there is no "permanent" easement from the USFS for Ms. 
Wescott, so it does not matter what the intent of the Temporary Easement was. Transcript on 
Appeal, July 23, 2014. pp. 28-31. This denial was additional abuse of discretion and the 
standard of Rule 15(a) that amendments should be "freely given." Through this denial, the 
District Court effectively condoned the withholding of requested documents which bear on the 
intent of the drafter of the Temporary Easement. 
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denials 
and 
,<,-.r,nc,r and the circumstances 
motions 
at 
District foreclosed itself 
was a 
from Leif Odmark to Kurt Nelson at the USFS dated July I 1998, detailing that Mr. Odmark 
had met with and coordinated with Douglas Woodcock on the pending '·application for a 
permanent easement" and referencing Lot 8. Transcript on Appeal, July 23. 2014, p. 11, L. 4-11. 
Admission of Mr. Odmark·s letter would have provided the Court with evidence of Mr. 
Odmark's intent in creating the Temporary Easement and assisted the Court with the 
interpretation of the document as a whole. The second document excluded by the District Court 
was a letter from Blaine County Planning and Zoning to Kurt Nelson at the USFS. dated August 
11, 1998, regarding the application for a special use permit. The Blaine County Planning and 
Zoning Department recommended that '·access to Lot 8 should be allowed from this same 
easement that the Woodcocks are requesting, if it is approved:' Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 
2014, p. 36. Admission of this letter would establish the clear intent to grant permanent access 
through the USFS for both Lots 8 and 9 as a precondition of vacating Jones Lane. The Staff 
Report to the Blaine County Board of Commissioners and the Forest Service News Release both 
were excluded from consideration for any evidence of intent. 
All relevant evidence of intent regarding an ambiguous document should be allowed. 
''When an instrument is ambiguous in nature. the intention of the parties as reflected by all of the 
circumstances in existence at the time the easement was given must be considered in construing 
the granting instrument." Latham v. Garner. 105 Idaho 854. 858. 673 P.2d 1048, 1052 (Idaho 
1983) (citing Quinn v. Stone, 75 Idaho 243,250.270 P.2d 825. 829-30 (1954)). "Therefore, the 
trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of the circumstances and intentions of the 
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original parties to the easement.,. Id .. court must consider all of the extrinsic 
to were they executed 
accepted instrument. Id. 
additional relevant evidence on the question of intent that they may have." Id. 
Failure to grant the motions to amend the complaint to open up these documents and their 
respective witnesses into the case, constituted error of the court because the documents provide 
relevant evidence of both the intent of the drafter of the easement and the circumstances in 
existence at the time the Temporary Easement was drafted. Granting the amendment to the 
complaint with these documents and witnesses would have shown that Mr. Odmak, Blaine 
County, the USFS, and the Woodcocks were working together to preserve the wetlands area 
bordering Lots 7, 8, and 9 by vacating Jones Lane. In order to prevent problems of access to 
these lots, all parties and agencies involved were working towards the establishment of 
permanent access over the USFS lands to the east of the lots. This had been contemplated since 
1998, two years prior to the sale of Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott. At the time the sale was negotiated, 
Mr. Odmark was fully expecting the USFS to grant the permanent access to Lots 8 and 9 within 
a short time. The Temporary Easement constituted a short-term solution to cover that period 
until the access easement was recorded by the U.S. Forest Service. The access contemplated was 
provided within four months of the transfer of Lot 8 to Ms. Wescott and was recorded on 
August 15, 2000. Mr. Odmark's letter to the USFS uses the same language that was used in the 
Temporary Easement, clarifying his intention that the Temporary Easement was only to be in 
place until the USFS access was resolved. The District Court erred in refusing to allow the 
amendments to the case. 
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The Temporary Easement is Equitably Unenforceable and Void for Lack 
of an Adequate Legal Description. 
16. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment qmetmg title the Temporary 
Access Easement is expired. void. terminated. and is no longer an encumbrance 
on the Plaintiffs. property. 
One of the equitable legal principals voiding a real property transfer is the lack of an adequate 
legal description. At the trial limited only to equitable issues, Mr. Kirk testified. referring to the 
language of the Temporary Easement, as follows: 
10 Q So you testified you went to the courthouse, 
11 and you found the map and the deed. and it had this --
12 A Easement. 
13 Q This easement? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q So you read it at that point? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Is there any way, can you measure that 
18 easement or chart it out? Did you try do that on the 
19 corner of your lot? 
20 A I tried to decipher what the coordinates are, 
21 but there are no coordinates of this easement. It's 
22 ambiguous as to what where, and how, if it was needed, 
23 where it would be. 
13 Q I'd ask you. Mr. Kirk. to tum to Plaintiffs' 
14 Exhibit 3. That's the warranty deed you found at the 
15 courthouse. correct? 
16 A Correct. 
1 7 Q And the second page is the temporary easement 
18 that you just referred to? 
19 A The circled part on page . 
20 Q The second page where it says Exhibit 1. 
21 A Oh. yes. 
22 Q That's the wTiting about the temporary 
23 easement, correct? 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Okay. And that's -- is that the part that you 
1 said you didn't have any coordinates on it? 
6 WITNESS: Yes. 
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16 Q Okay. So what would 
equitable basis 
8 to comer 
19 rather than leave this problem Ms. Wescott's 
20 temporary easement? What would you say to Judge Elgee? 
21 A I would say, one, we're arguing over a 
22 temporary easement which, in my view. doesn't even or 
23 wouldn't solve the problem Ms. Wescott was ever 
24 revoked the permanent or the easement from the forest 
25 service, because if I measure 25 feet, it doesn't even 
1 reach the county road. It would still access onto the 
2 forest service easement road anyway --
15 Q Okay. How does that weigh. in your mind. as 
16 to equities that you would say to Judge Elgee as to 
17 having your corner of your lot continued to be clouded 
18 by this problem? 
19 A I'm kind of gun shy to speak now. 
20 Q Right. Go ahead. 
21 A It leaves me holding the bag here for the 
22 neighbor with a cloud over my title with an easement 
23 that's not defined, but yet she still has access, she's 
24 got a driveway. it's in pavement. Hitchins, south of 
25 her access. Has two lovely homes there, permanent 
1 access. But I've got cloud over my title that I can't 
2 use this part of my lot now at that I purchased because 
3 of the interpretation of the temporary easement that 
4 Leif Odmark, a layman in himself over these things, the 
5 way I understand it, put in a temporary easement to 
6 help Ms. Wescott get access she needed to if they 
7 didn't come up with the forest service easement, which 
8 they did. 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, pp. 65 17-23: 66-67 LL 17-1: 68-69 Ll. 16-2; 78-79 LL 
15-8. In closing argument, Kirks' counsel argued in part: 
9 But when you look at this language on this 
10 temporary easement, and the word temporary is used over 
11 and over, so we know it was intended to be something 
12 short-term. but it uses 20-foot wide easement in the 
13 southeast comer oflot 7, block 1. And the only 
14 additional information is on attachments, two 
15 circles. The next page it just circles corner 
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16 there, no metes and bounds. no measurements. 
17 nothing. just a circle on 
8 And then the last page is a 
19 defined, but kind 
20 measurements, no nothing. I anybody 
21 there and decide, where does the 25-foot start? As 
22 what comer? Where do you start measurement 
23 25 feet? Wide or long? ls it the width north to south 
24 or east to west? There's no way to decide what that 
25 easement is. It's so vague and it's a big 
1 problem for enforcing this thing. But it is what it 
2 IS. 
Transcript on Appeal, July 23, 2014, pp. 94-95, 9-2. 
With regards to the sufficiency of real property transfer descriptions, a court must be able 
to determine from the face of the express document, not only the quantity and identity of the 
property being transferred, but also its boundaries. Lexington Heights. 140 Idaho at 281, 92 P .3d 
at 531: Bauchman-Kingston, 2008 WL 5133788 at *3; Ray, 146 Idaho at 629,200 P. 3d at 1178; 
and Magnolia Enterprises. LLC Schons, 2009 WL 1658022, *4. The express document may 
reference an extrinsic document if that document is exact in detailing the quantity, identity and 
boundaries of property being sold. Id. property description that does not allow the court to 
pinpoint exactly what acreage is to be transferred is inadequate." Bauchman-Kingston. 2008 WL 
5133788 at *3; Ray, 146 Idaho at 630,200 P. 3d at 1179. 
In the 2004 Lexington Heights case, the Idaho Supreme Court found a land sale contract 
invalid for failing to exactly describe the boundaries of the acreage reserved from the sale of a 
larger parcel. Supra. Lexington Heights Development, LLC, (''Lexington Heights") entered into 
an express agreement for the purchase of approximately 90 acres to be carved from a 95-acre 
parcel owned by Roger and Elizabeth Crandlernire. Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 279, 92 P.3d 
at 529. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF -
Since the Lexington Heights case, Supreme has revisited the issue of deficient 
2008 the case l. V. 
to reach same conclusion. Partnership. 
Haroldsen 2008 WL 5133788 (2008). The in the Bauchman-Kingston case executed a 
document in May of 2000 for the phased purchase of 200-acres located in Bonneville 
County, Idaho. 2008 WL 5133788 at *1. Under the terms of the contract, Bauchman-Kingston 
was to purchase the acreage over a six year period of time, which would culminate in the final 
purchase of the Seller's personal residence and out-buildings located on the last 4.9 acres. Id 
By June of 2006, Bauchman-Kingston had purchased all but 36 acres upon which were 4.9 acres 
including the Seller's residence and some out-building. Id at *3. Regarding the description of 
the 4.9 acres, the contract stated at paragraph 26: 
Id at* 1. 
OTHER TERMS: BUYER AGREE PURCHASE SELLERS [sic] 
RESIDENCE AND OUT BUILDINGS LOCATED 3359 N 5 WEST, AT 
FAIR MARKET VALUE WITH TERMS ACCEPT ABLE TO SELLER. 
PURCHASE PRICE SHALL BE BASED ON APPRAISEL [sic] 
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SELLER AND BUYER. BUYERS ARE 
COMPLETING A l 031 EXCHANGE WITH PURCHASE OF THIS 
PROPERTY. 
The Supreme Court in Bauchman-Kingston declined to enforce the contract by relying on 
the Lexington Heights ruling to conclude the Bauchrnan-Kingston agreement was invalid and 
unenforceable as to the property description regarding the 4. 9 acres. Id. The Court specifically 
stated, ''when only part of a parcel is sold, and neither the land to be conveyed nor the portion to 
be retained by the seller is adequately described, the property description is inadequate." Id at 
*3 (citing to Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 282, 92 P.3d at 532). The Court also emphasized 
that ''[a] property description that does not allow the court to pinpoint exactly what acreage is to 
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transferred is inadequate.,. Id. ( citing to Rehn. Idaho L 3, 644 P.2d 
( 
case Ray v. 
language the state of lmv as it pertains to the standard requiring property descriptions. See 
generally, Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009). In the Ray case, the parties 
entered into a written agreement for the sale of property described as: --2275 W. Hubbard Rd., 
City of Kuna, County of Ada, Idaho 83634. ·· Id. at 626, 200 3d. 1175. The Ray Court rejected 
the written agreement because the property description contained in the agreement failed to 
specify the quantity and boundaries of the prope11y being sold. Id. at 629. 200 3d. 1178. The 
Court stated, ··A description of real property must adequately describe the property so that it is 
(citing to Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430,435, 80 P.3 1031, 1036 (2003)). (emphasis added). 
The state of the law in Idaho regarding the standard for property descriptions required is 
clearly stated. A reference to a lot and block number without a political subdivision is not 
enough. Allen v. Kitchen. 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909). A reference to a tax parcel notice 
is not enough. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031. 1036 (Idaho 2003). A 
reference to a street address without a legal description is not enough. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 
625, 200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009). A reference to a map with writing is not enough. 
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership LP v. Haroldsen. No. 345 L 2008 WL 5133788, at *4 (Idaho 
2008). A reference to a survey yet to be conducted of land excluded from a sale is not enough. 
White v. Rehn. 103 Idaho 1,644 P.2d 323,325 (1982). And finally, a reference to a survey to be 
performed after execution of the contract is not enough. Lexington Heights Development, LLC v. 
Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276. 92 P.3d 526, 531 (Idaho 2004). The Idaho Supreme Court. has 
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it clear that it is the state of the law in 
wide Easement of Access (see plat map-Exhibit over the Southeast corner of Lot 7 of Block l 
.... " The Exhibit 2 referred to has only a hand drawn circle around the triangular comer and 
another page has only a hand drawing on the plat map with no beginning point no survey 
markings, no coordinates, no curvature descriptions, no lengths marked. and in short nothing to 
reasonably define the size and scope of purported easement. Where does one begin to 
measure the purported 25 feet? Where does it end? What direction does the 25 feet run? How 
much acreage does it cover? What is the curvature on the SE corner? There are no answers to 
any of these reasonable questions as to where the purported easement is located. Not only is the 
language of the Temporary Easement vague, the court cannot determine quantity and identity 
with any degree of certainty where it is to be located on the ground. 
Based upon the extensive case law authority set forth above, the trial court·s failure to 
grant equitable relief to Kirks based upon the lack of an adequate legal description was clearly 
erroneous. 
V. The Precondition was Not Satisfied for the Temporary Easement to 
Become "In Effect," and in any Event, the Temporary Easement Expired 
After One Year. 
By the express terms of the Temporary Easement drafted by Mr. Odmark, the easement 
never came into effect. Pursuant to the second paragraph, the easement would only come ··111 
Effect" upon receipt by the owner of Lot 8 of a written denial of access by the USFS. This grant 
of the "temporary Easement of Access" specifically states an express precondition to the title 
passing. The grant states that the easement does not become =T""·~" and unless the owner 
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owner to access across 
never received a 
denial of access. Thus. the precondition was never satisfied giving effect to the ·'temporary 
Easement of Access." It is undisputed that Ms. Wescott historically used the USFS road on the 
east to access Lot 8 and that Ms. Wescott continues to use the USFS easement today. Based on 
these facts. at no time did the .. temporary Easement of Access'' become effective. 
Notwithstanding this express precondition requiring absolute denial of an easement by 
the Forest Service before the .. temporary Easement of Access" came into effect. the express 
terms of the "temporary Easement of Access'' also contained specific temporal limitations to the 
grant. The grantor specifically stated in the grant that the owner of Lot 8 may only have use of 
an easement for ··one year or upon completion of the drivevvay, whichever occurs first." 
(Emphasis added]. It is undisputed that Ms. Wescott completed a [50-foot] circular driveway 
with an entrance connecting directly to the Forest Road Easement. Likewise, it is undisputed 
that more than one year's time has passed since the grant of the "temporary Easement of Access'' 
and several years have passed since the driveway was constructed. 
With continuous, unimpeded access from the USFS, for over fifteen years, the terms of 
the Temporary Easement have long since expired. The District Court should not have given any 
enforcement rights to the Temporary Easement. 
VI. Pursuant to I.A.R. 15, Respondent's Untimely Filed Notice of Cross 
Appeal Should be Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction. 
"In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
challenge a determination made by a lower court.'' Carr v. Carr. 116 Idaho 754. 757, 779 P.2d 
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429, 432 (Idaho App. 1989) (citing LA.R. to file such a notice 'shall cause 
on 21 
Rule 1 Idaho Appellate Rules, sets out a cross-appeal as follows: 
(b) Time for filing. A cross-appeaL as a matter of right, may be made 
only by physically filing the notice of cross-appeal with the clerk of the district 
court or administrative agency within the 42 day time limit prescribed in Rule 
14, as it applies to the judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is 
taken. or within 21 days after the date of filing of the original notice of appeal, 
whichever is later. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 15(b) (emphasis added). 
The District Court denied Ms. Wescott' s claim for attorney fees on November 3, 2014. R. 
Vol. I, p. 289. Mr. Wescott had 42 days from November 3, 2014 to file her Notice of Cross 
Appeal. The Notice of Cross Appeal (Suppl. R. Vol. L p. 70) was not filed until February 23, 
2015, a full 112 days after the ·'judgment or order from which the cross-appeal is taken." 
Ms. Wescott may argue that her Motion to Reconsider Defendant" s Memorandum of 
Costs extended the time to cross-appeal. However. the 42-day timeline is extended only if a timely 
motion is filed "which. if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any 
judgment in the action (except motions ... regarding costs or attorneys fees).'' I.A.R. 14(a) 
( emphasis added). It is well settled that "the filing of a motion for costs or attorney fees, or an 
objection to such a motion, does not extend the time to appeal a judgment" under I.A.R. 14(a). 
State ex rel. A1oore v. Lawson, 105 Idaho 164. 165, 667 P.2d 267, 268 (Ct.App.1983): See also 
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 719. 979 2d 118, 12] (Ct. App. 1999). 
Because Ms. Wescott' s cross-appeal was not timely filed. the Comi is without 
jurisdiction to make a determination regarding those issues pursuant to J.A.R. 21. Accordingly, 
Respondent's cross-appeal should he dismissed. 
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Regarding the substance of Wescott' s are not awardable to the 
(1 V. 87 cert. denied. u 
125 S. Ct. 311 (2004). This was not a 
Code § 12-121. Kirks will respond in substance 
cross-appeal. 
brought or pursued frivolously under Idaho 
\1s. Wescott sets out her initial brief on the 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Kirks respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
District Court's judgment dismissing the Kirks' Complaint and order that the First Amended 
Complaint be allowed with a full trial on the issues of fact including intent of the Temporary 
Easement. Alternatively, Kirks request reversal and final judgment entered declaring the 
termination of the Temporary Easement and otherwise quieting the Kirks' title to the Temporary 
Easement and the whole of Lot 7. 
DATED this day of January. 20 6. 
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